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Abstract: This article uses current developments in cognitive science to explore the emergence of 
early Christian religion. In particular, it considers Sperber’s epidemiology model, Rubin’s serial 
recall model, ritual form theory, and Boyer’s theory of religious concepts for understanding the 
transmission of early Christian thought. Whereas Sperber’s approach focuses on ideas (internal 
representations), Rubin concentrates on the transmission of texts (public representations). Two 
preliminary hypotheses are put forward in an attempt to apply cognitive scientific research the 
formative Christianity: the cognitive relevance hypothesis about core christological concepts, and 
the optimal transmission hypothesis addressing the balance of tradition and conceptual 
innovation.
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Résumé: Dans cette étude, les tout derniers développements des sciences cognitives sont mis à 
contribution afin d’explorer les origines de la religion chrétienne. Tout particulièrement, afin de 
comprendre la transmission de la pensée paléochrétienne, ont été pris en compte le modèle 
épidémiologique de Sperber, le modèle des rappels en série de Rubin, la théorie des formes 
rituelles et la théorie des concepts religieux de Boyer. L’approche de Sperber se concentre sur les 
idées (représentations internes), tandis que Rubin se consacre davantage à la transmission des 
textes (représentations publiques). L’application des résultats de la recherche des sciences 
cognitives aux origines du christianisme se traduit par deux hypothèses préliminaires : 
l’hypothèse de la pertinence cognitive, au sujet des concepts christologiques essentiels, et 
l’hypothèse de la transmission optimale, à propos de l’équilibre qui existe entre tradition et 
innovation conceptuelle.
1. The challenge of locating Christian origins
After two centuries of modern biblical scholarship, the origins of early Christian religion still 
remain unclear. Anyone studying first century Christianity has to realise both the diversity and 
complexity of the phenomenon. Already the earliest documents reflect the existence of 
surprisingly different and often rivalling groups of the new religion. The variety of views and 
practices found in the earliest writings is so great, that it is almost impossible to find a minimal 
definition of Christianity. One should compare, for example, the views about Jesus’ death and 
human salvation in Romans, the Epistle of James, the Gospel of Thomas, or the Acts of John. 
Indeed, the very notion of a single origin of Christian religion seems to be an elusive one.
Not only the variety, but also the complexity of early Christian religion is highly 
perplexing. Most religions in Greco-Roman antiquity were cults, which can be basically 
described in terms of rites and institutions. Mythology was also important, but it was transmitted 
in a number of different ways (history, poetry, fine arts, etc.) rather than controlled by religious 
institutions. The interpretation of mythology, together with the discussion of the great issues of 
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life, was outside the realm of religion. In Early Christianity, in contrast, a single institution 
coordinated aspects of mythology, ritual, social life, philosophy, and ethics.
If we consider this complexity, it is not surprising that scholars have sought the origins of 
Early Christianity in such diverse corners of antiquity as mystery cults (e.g. Reitzeinstein 1927 
[1910]), moral philosophy (e.g. Malherbe 1989; Crossan 1991), apocalyptic Judaism (e.g. 
Schweitzer 1906), or social movements (e.g. Theissen 1977), to name only a few. My own 
attempt at studying Christian origins takes into account the diversity of the phenomenon as well 
as of its sources. Instead of investigating the origin of specific elements of early Christian 
religion, I am interested in how motifs (from different sources) combine with each other. Most 
studies of Early Christianity concentrate on written texts, and less attention is given to other 
aspects of religion, such as rites, institutions, oral tradition, and sociological embedding. 
Scholars’ preference to textual problems can be explained by post-enlightenment biases as well 
as the fact that there is hardly any other direct evidence about first century Christians available to 
us than their writings.
The transmission of early Christian texts has been the focus of one of the most influential 
projects of modern Biblical scholarship, namely, form-criticism or Formgeschichte (Bultmann 
1995 [1921]; Theissen 1995). Form critics study the origin and transmission of the small units 
(kleine Einheiten) of the tradition up to their fixation in writing. The origin and use of the textual 
units is connected to typical situations of life, or Sitze im Leben. It is important to notice that the 
Sitz im Leben is not a concrete historical event, as rather a typical, recurring situation in the life 
of first century Christians, such as baptism, ethical debates, etc. (cf. Bultmann 1995 [1921]: 4). 
Whereas my project shares the interest of form-criticism in the earliest transmission of Christian 
texts, my method differs from Formgeschichte at several points.
First, I do not attempt to locate the origin of textual traditions in the life of first century 
Christians. Instead, I hypothesise a set of pre-existent traditions, such as pieces of Jewish and 
Hellenistic literature, oral tradition about messianic or charismatic figures, including Jesus, 
popular sayings and wisdom collections (again, possibly including Jesus’ own words), etc. My 
question is how and why early Christian thought (as reflected in the texts) came into existence 
from those building blocks.
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Second, to understand the how of this procedure, I employ the results of modern 
cognitive science. Whereas form-criticism drew on some ideas of contemporary folklore studies, 
today a large quantity of cognitive research is available that can be utilised in understanding 
orality, memory, ritual, and other aspects of cultural transmission. Unlike form-criticism, I do not 
regard Early Christianity as a purely oral culture. Although estimates of ancient literacy widely 
differ (Harris 1989), and distinction has to be made between elite and sub-elite literacy (Morgan 
1998, esp. 140-51; Cribiore 2001: 63, 172 and passim), we can safely calculate with many 
literate Christians even in the beginnings. A good illustration is provided by the epistles of Paul, 
which were not only written, but also read, answered, discussed, and distributed. Various levels 
of literacy could have existed in parallel: some were able to read but not to write; others could 
scribble down a few names or sayings; a few were educated enough to be able to compose a 
whole gospel. Orality and literacy could have existed side by side and perhaps interacted from 
the very beginning (cf. Botha 2004).
Third, in order to answer the question as to why early Christian tradition developed in the 
ways it did, I consider reasons beyond the daily needs of the congregations as well as beyond 
immediate social or socio-economic motivations. It is likely that certain pieces of the tradition 
served for social groups or congregations as guides, rules, or propaganda in specific historical 
situations. Such an approach is especially tempting if one concentrates on the ‘small units’ 
(kleine Einheiten), as form-criticism did. However, most Christian texts are known to us from a 
complex history of transmission. The success of those traditions was due to their appeal to 
people living in different times, geographical areas, and social locations. In addition to 
examining the micro-cultural and cultural reasons of their popularity, we can pose the question of 
why those traditions are so appealing to the human mind that, after surviving so many centuries, 
even in our days they continue to influence people living in distant places and cultures.
If someone deems such an approach too universal, we have to remember that the basic 
structures of the human mind have been shaped by evolution through tens of thousands of years. 
On the anthropological level, there is no difference between the apostle Paul and us. As recent 
cognitive studies of religion argue, most of our basic religious concepts can be related to some 
important mechanisms of our minds (Boyer 2001 [2000]: 106-54; Atran 2002; Pyysiäinen 2003: 
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18-22). These theories do not claim that religious ideas are direct consequences of certain brain 
structures, but rather that certain ideas especially appeal to us because our minds can work with 
them in particularly efficient ways. In other words, religious ideas survive only if they adapt 
themselves to the structure of the human mind. We can hypothesise that religious ideas with an 
exceptional success – to which early Christian thought certainly belongs – are exceptionally 
efficient in using the structures of the human mind. In the rest of my article I will focus on 
cognitive approaches to transmission and on how they could be applied to early Christian 
tradition.
2. Christian thought as an epidemic of beliefs
In 1996, Dan Sperber has proposed a theory of “Selection and Attraction in Cultural Evolution,” 
building on his earlier discussion of “The Epidemiology of Beliefs” and other studies (1996: 76-
118). Sperber investigates how mental representations cause public productions, which in turn 
result in other mental representations. He is influenced by Richard Dawkins’ evolutionary 
approach to culture, but his model is preferable because it takes into account the important 
differences between biological evolution and the transmission of culture. In the reproduction of 
biological genes, exact replication is the rule: mutations occur only once in a million times. In 
cultural transmission, in contrast, replication can be viewed as a limiting case of the more 
widespread phenomenon of ‘influence’. Using Sperber’s example:
Two pottery teachers may have shared the same pupils, and therefore have the 
same cultural descendants, but their cultural descendants may be much more 
influenced by one teacher than by the other. The resulting pots, too, may be 
descendants of both teachers’ pots, but more like the pots of the one than of the 
other. (1996: 105)
Moreover, if we regard bits of culture (such as individual texts, pots, songs, or individual abilities 
to produce them) as replications of earlier bits, we have to conclude that each token is a replica 
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not of one parent token (or two in the case of sexual reproduction), but rather of an indefinite 
number of tokens, some of which have played a greater ‘parental’ role than others.
If we apply Sperber’s model to the transmission of early Christian texts, we can classify 
both written and oral texts as public representations, which were caused by mental 
representations, and evoked further mental representations in their readers and listeners. Texts 
are never (except when photocopied) direct descendants of earlier texts, but rather of mental 
representations caused by them. When texts result in mental representations in the minds of the 
readers or listeners, or people create texts from their mental representations, a number of 
components interact with each other.
Potentially pertinent psychological factors include the ease with which a particular 
representation can be memorized, the existence of background knowledge in relationship to 
which the representation is relevant, and a motivation to communicate the content of the 
representation. Ecological factors include the recurrence of situations in which the representation 
gives rise to, or contributes to, appropriate action, the availability of external memory stores 
(writing in particular), and the existence of institutions engaged in the transmission of the 
representation (Sperber 1996: 84, cf. 113-118).
Finally, Sperber hypothesises ‘attractors’, toward which representations assimilate during 
the process of transmission:
In the logical space of possible versions of a tale, some versions have a better 
form: that is, a form seen as being without either missing or superfluous parts, 
easier to remember, and more attractive. The factors that make for a good form 
may be rooted in part in universal human psychology and in part in local cultural 
context. (1996: 108)
Sperber’s concept about the transmission of cultural ideas gives a number of cues for applying 
the model to early Christian tradition. We can take his notion about the role of ‘public 
representations’ as a point of departure and elaborate on the various factors involved in the 
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success of transmission. The spread of Christian ideas in the first and early second century can 
be modelled as a case of cultural epidemic.
One particular environmental factor of cultural epidemic, which is not specifically 
addressed by Sperber, is the role of social networks which transmit cultural innovations. The 
very same cultural bit (or biological virus) that does not spread in one type of social 
environment, will make quick advance and cause an epidemic in a different type of social 
structure (Buchanan 2002: 156-183). The quick spread of (biological or cultural) information is 
enabled by so-called small-diameter networks, characterised by short-distance as well as long-
distance connections (cf. Watts & Strogatz 1998; Albert et al. 1999). To translate this into largely 
simplified but more concrete terms, small-diameter networks are formed when people know their 
neighbours (consequently, there is much chance that they will come into contact with a new 
piece of information once it is present in their environment) but some of them also have long-
distance connections (so that the ‘virus’ appears at distant places almost simultaneously). Jewish 
society in the first century Mediterranean formed a perfect basis for creating and maintaining a 
social network with local subnets and long-distance connections which enabled the quick spread 
of the Christian message. An analysis of the social structure of the earliest Christian movement, 
using network theory, may shed more light on the rapid success of the new religion. An optimal 
combination of settled and wandering individuals seems to provide a good general starting point 
(Theißen 1985 [1977]: 14; Crossan 1998: 355-364; cf. Arnal 2001).
Recent cognitive research of religion and textual transmission has challenged the 
classical concept of mental representations used by Sperber. The dualism of ‘private’ and ‘public’ 
representations disappears in ‘embodied cognition’ (e.g. Ziemke 2002), an approach which 
emphasises the interplay of neuronal and environmental factors in thinking. Some embodied 
aspects of cognition are considered in this article; the full potential of embodied theories for 
understanding early Christian transmission will be explored at a later occasion.
3. Christian tradition in oral memory
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Whereas the importance of oral transmission in the emergence of Christian thought has been 
recognised since a long time, little if anything has been done to exploit the potential of memory 
studies in this area (cf. Botha 2004). In this section we will mainly consider cognitive 
perspectives raised by David Rubin’s Memory in Oral Traditions (1995). In examining the 
mechanisms responsible for stability and change in oral traditions, Rubin proceeds from the work 
of the famous pioneers of orality studies, Milman Parry and Albert Lord (Lord 1960; Parry 
1971). He analyses different types of oral traditions, such as counting-out rhymes, epic, and 
ballads. When people remember texts, Rubin concludes, they rely on features such as 
organisation of meaning, imagery, and patterns of sound, including the poetic devices of rhyme, 
alliteration, and assonance, as well as rhythm and music (1995: 10). The process of remembering 
relies on the sequential organisation of the text.
Oral traditions, like all oral language, are sequential. One word follows another as 
the physical effects of the first word are lost. As the song advances, each word 
uttered changes the situation for the singer, providing new cues for recall and 
limiting choices. (1995: 175)
In order to explain how performers remember long and elaborate texts, Rubin proposes a “theory 
of serial recall in oral traditions”:
Recall in oral traditions is serial. It starts at the first word, or perhaps a rhythm or 
melody, and proceeds sequentially. […] At the beginning of the song, genre-
specific (i.e., schematic) constraints are known and are useful as cues. Each word, 
as it is sung, provides additional cues that are specific to the song the way it is 
sung this time. (1995: 176)
Rubin also tested his theory outside the realm of oral cultures. He asked students to recite texts 
which all American children memorise at school, such as the Preamble of the American 
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Constitution. He found that the rules of ‘serial recall’ apply to the remembering of those 
passages:
Although many Americans can directly recall anecdotes about the conditions 
under which the Preamble, Gettysburg Address, or national anthem was originally 
written or delivered, they cannot provide a summary of the pieces themselves 
without first recalling them in order and then analysing their own recalls […]. 
(1995: 182)
Whereas Rubin acknowledges that “for many oral traditions, the overall theme of a piece enters 
as a major cuing device,” he warns that “some pieces of oral traditions are difficult to summarize 
even when they are written out in full, the meaning being implicitly tied to the whole genre 
rather than explicitly to the words sung” (1995: 188-9). That is, one should not think about 
theme, meaning, or imagery, as a condensed version of the whole text, which can be, in turn, 
automatically expanded to the long version.
Rubin approaches textual transmission differently form than Sperber. In Sperber’s view, 
human mind stores representations, such as ideas, beliefs, and propositions. Texts are public 
representations, which generate similar mental representations in other minds. In Rubins’s 
model, mental representations play a different role in the transmission of texts. Instead of 
expressing abstract ideas and beliefs in texts, the transmitter uses mental imagery, schemas, and 
associations to recall the text. What is transmitted is basically the text with the help of mental 
representations and not mental representations with the help of the text.
Early Christians, as we have argued, did not live in a purely oral culture. Nevertheless, 
the public reading, memorisation, and recitation of texts played an important role in their 
Hellenistic, Jewish, or Hellenistic-Jewish cultural environments. Shall we regard their texts as 
expressions of abstract beliefs and ideas, or rather as literary works obeying the rules of oral 
composition and transmission? In other words, when we compare two versions of a miracle story 
in the synoptic gospels, shall we analyse the conceptual (theological) differences between the 
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two versions, or rather look at the underlying mechanisms of oral tradition, such as genre, 
imagery, rhythm, sound, rhyme, etc.
Although Rubin finds that the rules of ‘serial recall’ apply to remembering in 
contemporary American society as well as in oral cultures, he also mentions differences. As we 
move from a purely oral context toward literate societies, the organisational focus of texts 
changes: “the local, implicit, word-by-word or phrase-by-phrase cuing is the dominant form in 
oral traditions, whereas more global organization is present in many other kinds of materials” 
(1995: 177).
We can hypothesise that also within Early Christianity, people with a higher level of 
literacy paid more attention to the global organisation of the material. A focus on the conceptual 
level of the tradition, instead of the textual level, is characteristic, for example, of Paul’s epistles. 
When citing Scriptural passages, Christian hymns, catalogues, and other texts, however, Paul 
relies on the mechanisms of ‘serial recall,’ as also American students did when asked to quote the 
Preamble of the Constitution.
How do texts evolve during the process of oral transmission? Whereas evolution is 
central to Sperber’s model, Rubin only mentions that “changes in the environment can change 
(select for) aspects of the genre.” Oral transmission, in fact, is basically conservative. Although 
in the “Introduction” Rubin promises to account for the stability and change in oral traditions 
(1995: 3), his emphasis is evidently on the fact that “songs, stories, and poems are kept in stable 
form in memory for centuries.” In Rubin’s book, we find examples of changing words, phrases, 
lines, or sequence. It is, however, beyond the scope of Rubin’s theory to explain how new texts 
using traditional patterns, or new genres, emerge.
Finally, we can notice that whereas Rubin makes an impressive case for ‘serial recall’ and 
the underlying poetic tools, the semantic features of epic, ballads, and rhymes remain largely 
neglected in his book. The powerful imagery of folklore, one may argue, activates very basic and 
archaic mechanisms of the mind, which substantially contribute to the long-standing 
transmission of those texts (cf. Pyysiäinen 2004: 147-59).
4. Transmission and rituals
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The problem of how religious ideas are transmitted (and whether they are transmitted at all) has 
been one of the central issues in the recent cognitive study of religion (cf. Barrett 2000).
Other cognitive theories of religion examined the role of rituals in the transmission of 
religious tradition. From the early ’90s, Thomas Lawson and Robert McCauley applied linguistic 
competence theory to explaining rituals (Lawson and McCauley 1990; McCauley and Lawson 
2002). According to linguistic competence theory, speakers of a language possess “a wide array 
of grammatical principles and processors” that enables them “to produce and comprehend 
linguistic strings and to render an assortment of relatively systematic judgements about the 
syntactic and semantic character of those strings” (Lawson and McCauley 1990: 4). With great 
simplification, competence theory claims that speakers of a language, even without formal 
education, can decide whether a sentence is correct or incorrect. The same kind of competence, 
Lawson and McCauley argue, seems to hold for rituals: “With little, if any, explicit instruction, 
religious ritual participants are able to make judgements about various properties concerning 
both individual rituals and their ritual systems” (1990: 5).
Rituals are conceptualised, Lawson and McCauley proceed, like any other action, that is, 
with the help of a so-called action representation system (1990: 10). The representation of a 
(ritual) action includes three elements: an agent, an act, and a patient (1990: 14). To put it 
simply: someone does something to someone (or something) else. Some actions also involve an 
instrument. In the conceptualisation of rituals, one of the agent, the instrument, or the patient, is 
connected more closely to a divine being than the other two. Accordingly, Lawson and 
McCauley write about “special agent,” “special instrument,” or “special patient” rituals (1990: 
23-9). The major hypothesis of Lawson and McCauley is that special agent rituals are the ones 
which participants (persons who are patients of the ritual) remember the most intensely (1990: 
138). Other types of rituals (special instrument and special patient rituals), if they are to be 
remembered, must be repeated more frequently.
During the time that Lawson and McCauley were developing their theory of ritual forms, 
Harvey Whitehouse put forward his own theory of rituals and transmission, based on his 
ethnographic fieldwork in Papua New Guinea (1995, 2000, 2004). Whereas in McCauley and 
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Lawson’s ritual form hypothesis both frequency and sensory stimulation are functions of how the 
role of supernatural agents is conceptualised in the ritual, in Whitehouse’s ritual frequency 
hypothesis sensory stimulation, the use of memory systems, and a number of other variables are 
functions of performance frequency.
5. Does transmission matter?
Linguistic competence theory, serving as a model for Lawson and McCauley’s ritual form theory, 
is the foundational hypothesis of contemporary linguistics (cf. Chomsky 1957; 1965: 3-4; 1968: 
4). An important consequence of competence theories is that they presuppose some form of 
innateness of the underlying structures of (ritual) language (cf. Chomsky 1968: 24 and passim; 
Hauser, Chomsky, Fitch 2002). People can judge any sentence (of their native language) or any 
ritual as correct or incorrect, even if they have never heard or seen it before. Consequently, there 
must be a universal grammar which children use to make sense of the linguistic data they 
experience as they grow up.
In the cognitive study of religion, the nature perspective has been taken by Pascal Boyer. 
Building on Sperber’s epidemiology model, Boyer suggested that universal human psychology 
plays the crucial role in the propagation of religious concepts (Boyer 2002 [2001]: 106-54, 375-7 
and passim). Boyer’s model is based on the notion of specialised mental modules shaped by 
evolution, an approach represented for example by Steven Mithen (1996) and Steven Pinker 
(1998 [1997]). When we are confronted with new information, our minds do not pull out little 
icons from a mental storage, as it were, to compare them with the new ‘cultural bit’, but rather a 
few specialised inference systems are activated. Inference systems quickly process the relevant 
information to make decisions and urge us to take appropriate actions. Some of the millions of 
messages exchanged among people, Boyer argues, grab the attention better than others by using 
our mental needs and capacities more efficiently.
Let us take the example of gods and spirits, to which Boyer has paid particular attention. 
The conceptualisation of these so-called counter-intuitive agents relies on various features of the 
human mind shaped by evolution (cf. Boyer 2002 [2001]: 155-231, 375-6). (1) The agent 
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detection system, specialised on the identification of purposefully moving things, originally 
served to detect the presence of dangerous beasts and potential prey in our environment. (2) Our 
theory of mind enables us to simulate other people’s thoughts and feelings. (3) Moral intuitions 
serve social interaction and successful cooperation. When we hear of spirits and gods, we can 
intuitively compare them to the unseen presence of predators and make conjectures about their 
perception, knowledge, and plans. Most importantly, we attribute them full knowledge of 
strategic social information, that is, knowledge of “morally relevant aspects of what we do and 
what others do to us.” “When counter-intuitive agents are construed in this way,” Boyer 
concludes,
it becomes easy to connect them to striking cases of misfortune, because we are 
predisposed to see misfortune as a social event, as someone’s responsibility rather 
than the outcome of mechanical processes. So the agents are now described as 
having powers such that they can visit disasters upon people, which adds to the 
list of their counter-intuitive properties and probably to their salience. (2002 
[2001]: 376)
In a recent study, Jesse Bering reports the results of an experiment in which individuals with 
different kinds of explicit afterlife beliefs were asked in an implicit interview task about how 
mental states and biological imperatives continue after death (Bering 2002). According to 
implicit mental models of Bering’s subjects, dead agents cease to have psychobiological and 
perceptual states (they do not eat or hear, for example), whereas they continue to have emotions, 
desires, and epistemic states. From the experiment Bering concludes that subjects attribute to 
dead agents those types of mental states that they cannot imagine being without:
Because we know what it is like, for example, to have our vision occluded and 
subsequently not to be able to see anything, we are able to call upon those 
experiences of absence and more effectively represent the mental ability to see as 
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ending at death than, say, the ability to think, which no sentient person has ever 
consciously been without. (2002: 288)
Bering further suggests that “the social transmission process plays somewhat less a role in 
spreading ghost concepts than has been thought.” Rather, he proposes,
implicit afterlife beliefs (...) would be characterized more or less as innate – 
piggybacking standard mental representational abilities specialized to human 
beings.
“Ghosts come from within, not without,” Bering concludes, deciding characteristically for nature 
against nurture concerning the origins of religion.
6. Methodological implications for the study of early Christian thought
The theories outlined in the foregoing sections offer three different perspectives on the 
transmission of early Christian thought. (1) Various concepts in the first century Mediterranean, 
particularly Jewish and Hellenistic religious ideas, combined in specific ways to yield a 
successful new religion, which later became known as Christianity. (2) A selection of stories, 
wisdom sayings, hymns, and apocalyptic oracles transmitted in the first century gradually formed 
a meaningful unity for a group of people in the Eastern Mediterranean to yield what we know as 
early Christian literature. The model can be extended to rituals, music, art, architecture, and other 
cultural bits, as well. (3) The innate and universal readiness of humans to entertain religious 
concepts and perform rituals met with particular environmental clues in the Eastern 
Mediterranean which led to particularly successful realisations of those religious instincts.
All three scenarios dictate different pathways of investigation. Is Christianity the product 
of philosophical ingenuity, poetic talent, or is it a natural (biological) phenomenon? Were the 
first Christians mainly philosophers, scribes, or religious talents? What is the essence of 
Christianity: its theological sophistication, its rich and inspiring textual and ritual tradition, or the 
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piety of Christian believers? Who are the real heroes: Aquinas and Calvin, Dante and Bach, or 
Francis of Assisi and Nicolaus von Zinzendorf? What is then the task of theology: to analyse 
concepts, interpret Christian art, or understand the schlechthinniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl, the 
innate religious awe? The methodological choices taken in the beginning obviously imply very 
different agendas not only for the student of the New Testament and Early Christianity, but also 
for the church-goer and the theologian.
In an attempt to organise these different approaches into a complex hermeneutics of 
religious transmission, it is useful to consider how they apply to other cultural domains. Music, 
for example, is made possible as well as is constrained by innate capacities of the mind shaped 
by evolution for different purposes, such as screening the environment, communication, or 
logical reasoning (cf. Pinker 1998 [1997]: 528-38; Jerison 2000; Koelsch 2005). At the same 
time, music consists of transmitted cultural bits. Melodies, rhythms, scales, and harmonies are 
transmitted from generation to generation. The transmission of ideas is equally important: 
polyphony, kontrapunkt, or complex harmonies are examples of innovation occurring on the 
conceptual level. In sum, without taking transmission into consideration, it is not possible to 
understand music around the globe, or the development of European music, for example.
In a similar way we can argue that understanding early Christian religion requires the 
coordinated application of all three perspectives. An important distinction made by Boyer has to 
be addressed at this point. When confronted with the fact that many religious ideas do not obey 
the rules of mental economy suggested by the theory of counter-intuitiveness (see above), Boyer 
makes a distinction between the intuitiveness of folk religion (to which his model applies), on 
one hand, and sophisticated ideas maintained only by religious professionals, on the other hand. 
To translate this to our categories, popular religiosity could be explained basically in terms of 
mental structures, whereas professional theology requires mechanisms of cultural transmission 
(cf. Boyer 2002: 99).1 To refer back to our earlier example, folk music (a) is not always simple or 
intuitive (think of Balkan rhythms), (b) depends on transmission as well as innovation, and (c) 
influences professional music and vice versa. Speaking of religious traditions, much of biblical 
literature testifies to the cross-fertilisation of folklore and theology, and popular religiosity in 
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various contemporary cultures is inspired by the ‘official’ teaching and practice of the Christian 
churches.
7. The cognitive relevance hypothesis
In the rest of my article I will advance two preliminary hypotheses about the Christian 
conceptualisation of Jesus and the early gospel tradition. The first hypothesis will be called the 
cognitive relevance hypothesis of Christology. In terms of this hypothesis, the early Christian 
conceptualisation of Jesus adapted to the economy of the mind by closely approaching the 
archaic idea of ancestors (cf. Czachesz: forthcoming). What happens after death has kept human 
reflection busy since times immemorial (recently Bremmer 2002; Segal 2004). Although much 
of the discussion in Western theology has focused on the fate of souls in heaven and hell, and the 
so-called near-death experiences have received plenty of attention among believers and sceptics 
alike, the real issue from the scientific point of view is rather how people feel and think about 
other peoples’ death.
All of us have very complex mental representations (thoughts, feelings, beliefs) about 
other humans. We suppose that humans (as well as animals) have goals and their actions are 
governed by those goals. With the help of our theory of mind, we calculate the thoughts and 
feelings of other people.2 This system can also be used when the person whose behaviour we are 
simulating is absent. When someone dies, some of these mental tools can be easily switched off, 
as it were: we do not expect the dead person to move or speak, for example (cf. Boyer 2002 
[2001]: 159-60; Bering 2002). Other mechanisms, however, do not stop working: we keep 
talking to a dead relative and have strong feelings of how he or she would think, speak, or act in 
a given situation. After all, our ability to simulate the thoughts and feelings of other people 
works excellently even without a sensory input.
Therefore, dead people are an easily conceivable form of supernatural agents. In many 
cultures, indeed, ancestors play a central role in religion. They are very close to ordinary 
humans, except for a few attributes, such as having bodies and being constrained by them in their 
motion. Our ability to think about supernatural beings in that way is further supported by various 
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observations in our natural environment. Seeds are transformed into plants, eggs into chicken, 
caterpillars into butterflies. Metamorphoses happen around us, this is exactly the common-sense 
observation on which Paul builds his argument about resurrection (1 Corinthians 15:35-53; cf. 
John 12:24).
In a great part of early Christian tradition, the concept of Jesus is cognitively relevant 
because Jesus is conceived of as a dead person transformed into an ancestor. This is what enables 
him to mediate between humans and God (who, in contrast, is thought of as a more distant and 
sophisticated supernatural being). This is also what enables humans to imitate him in his 
resurrection: humans, as Paul argues, can undergo a similar metamorphosis as Jesus did. The 
synoptic Jesus calls his followers his family, the Johannine Jesus calls the disciples his friends, 
and Paul argues that we are, like Jesus, sons of God rather than his slaves (Mark 3:31-35 and 
par.; John 15:12-15; Gal 4:1-7). Much of this imagery is effective because Jesus is conceived of 
as an ancestor standing between humans and the higher supernatural beings.
8. The optimal transmission hypothesis
The second hypothesis is called the optimal transmission hypothesis of Christianity. In terms of 
this hypothesis, Early Christianity optimally combined textual transmission with conceptual 
innovation. Above I have suggested that focusing on the concepts in the tradition is characteristic 
of Paul, whereas the oral tradition quoted by him is determined mainly by the rules of serial 
recall. Although conceptual innovation certainly occurs in oral traditions as well, it seems that 
the large scale combination and transformation of concepts that is characteristic of the Pauline 
epistles is not found, for example, in the greatest part of the synoptic texts. Although it has been 
usual to attribute to the synoptic authors a host of refined manipulations of the texts which are 
supposed to express nuanced theological views of the writers, perhaps many differences between 
the synoptics can be explained using cognitive models of memory and transmission.
In an earlier attempt to evaluate the potential of cognitive science for the study of the 
gospels (Czachesz 2003), I introduced schema theory (particularly the script model of R.C. 
Schank and R.P. Abelson) and suggested that early Christian literature relies on a small number 
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of scripts, such as the “martyrdom script,” the “gospel script,” the “healing script,” or “divine 
call.” Scripts are evoked by the occurrence of typical motifs, and the story is made up using the 
known details, whereas unknown details are filled up with default values of the relevant script. 
The importance of thinking in scripts is that the occurrence of a typical motif makes other details 
predictable. When hearing of martyrdom, for example, no one will predict that the hero was 
assassinated. The formation of narrative scripts such as the ones used in early Christian literature 
raises a difficult question about their emergence. Schemas of miraculous healing are unlikely to 
be formed by life experience (like the scripts of Schank and Abelson), and they are equally 
unlikely to be hard-wired in the brain (like the innate ontological categories). The discussion of 
this problem transcends the frames of this article: some combination of innate mental structures 
and life experience is probably the key to the solution.
During the performance of oral tradition, scripts serve as underlying story-grammars to 
the narrative, being actualised and filled up with the help of serial recall. Non-narrative elements 
often contain lists, another important textual structure widely attested in ancient literature. The 
performance of lists is a particularly virtuous task in oral recitation (Minchin 2001: 76, 80, 
quoting Chadwik and Chadwik 1940: 185), and the family tree of Matthew 1:1-17 may have 
given the speaker an outstanding opportunity to demonstrate his performative talent and grab the 
attention of his audience.3
Using cognitive models of memory, it may be possible to show that parallel passages of 
early Christian gospel literature, particularly great parts of the synoptic gospels, record different 
performances of the same gospel narrative. This does not exclude the possibility that the authors 
added material from other (written) sources: a delicate interplay of oral and written 
communication (Andersen 1991: 45-53), rather than dichotomy (cf. Kelber 1983) must have 
characterised Early Christianity. Nevertheless, using such a method, differences between parallel 
texts formerly attributed to theological agendas may prove to have resulted from the rules of oral 
transmission. Moreover, this approach may provide us with insights about the pre-Christian 
sources of gospel narratives, considering not only literary parallels (e.g. Deuteronomy [Moessner 
1989], 1 and 2 Kings [Brodie 2000, 2004], Homer [MacDonald 2000, 2003]) but also the 
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possibility of a long-standing, pre-Christian oral transmission of several elements of the gospels, 
possibly including, but not restricted to, traditions about the historical Jesus.
Finally, a cognitive approach to the function of rituals in early Christian transmission has 
the potential of shedding new light on the traditional concept of Sitz im Leben. The two central 
rituals emerging in the early Church, eucharist and baptism, provided two different mechanisms 
of transmitting and consolidating memories. Baptism was a low frequency ritual in which 
everyone participated as an initiate only once in a life. Although we do not have a description of 
the ritual and the preparations for it in Paul’s epistles, the instructions of Didache as well as 
various passages of Acts give us an idea of the form of baptism in the first century (cf. Barth 
1981: 125-36; Yarnold 2001). Two key elements have to be mentioned in particular: instruction 
(Didache VII.1; Matthew 28:19-20; Acts 8:26-40; cf. Hebrews 6:1-2), serving the transmission 
of key concepts of Christian belief, and fasting (Didache VII.4; Acts 9:9; cf. Justin, Apology 
I.61.2), which facilitates extra sensory stimulation and thereby helps the formation of long term 
autobiographical memories. McCauley and Lawson’s ritual form theory (see above) also 
explains why baptism creates long-lasting emotional experience. In terms of their theory, baptism 
is a “special agent ritual,” in which the baptising official of the church, that is, the agent 
performing the ritual act, is conceptualised as having the most intimate relation with God among 
the participants. Such rituals, McCauley and Lawson argue, are conceived of as powerful acts of 
God, which makes them especially significant in the memory of the participants.
Eucharist, in turn, is a frequently performed ritual, in which the closest connection to God 
is attributed to the bread and the wine. In this case, McCauley and Lawson talk about a “special 
instrument ritual,” which generates less intense memories, but this is compensated by the higher 
frequency of performance. 1 Corinthians 11 attests how the ritual of the Eucharist was still under 
formation at Paul’s time. In his instruction, the apostle makes use of the practice of communal 
meals for the purpose of transmitting the memory and interpretation of the Last Supper. The two 
rituals, it appears, emerged to fill two ‘attractor positions’ in the spectrum of possible ritual 
forms: baptism as a low frequency ritual with high sensory stimulation, Eucharist as a high 
frequency ritual with low sensory stimulation. The conflict in Corinth displays a typical problem 
of high frequency rituals. Frequently repeated, routinised rituals easily become tiresome and 
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uninteresting (so-called ‘tedium-effect’), which can be temporarily balanced by extra sensory 
pageantry (Whitehouse 2000: 44-6; McCauley and Lawson 2002: 207-10). In Corinth, excessive 
eating and drinking served this purpose: “one goes hungry and another becomes drunk 
(methuei)” (1 Corinthians 11:21). Another result of tedium is the formation of factions, which is 
also evident from the epistle (1 Corinthians 1:10-17; 3:1-23; 8:9; 11:19; 12:1-13:31; cf. recently 
Theissen 2003).
Applying our distinction of conceptual (Sperber) and textual (Rubin) transmission, it can 
be assumed that high frequency rituals enable the transmission of longer texts through frequent 
repetition and make use of serial recall. Low frequency rituals, in turn, facilitate the transmission 
of core concepts together with the intense emotional experience attached to them, which can be 
reformulated time again in different words.
9. Conclusion
This article has considered various insights from cognitive science for the study of the 
emergence of Early Christianity: cultural epidemic, small-world networks, serial recall, ritual 
form theory, and conterintuitive agents. We have suggested that although these cognitive 
approaches emphasise different aspects of Christian history, their integrated application to the 
Christian beginnings is the most fruitful strategy. Two hypotheses have been put forward, in 
particular, in the final part of the article, which highlight two factors in the success of Christian 
religion: the cognitive optimality of Christology, and the efficient combination of conceptual and 
textual transmission.
The two hypotheses in this article exploit only a small part of the potential of using 
cognitive science for the study of Christian beginnings. These initial steps will hopefully 
encourage students of (early) Christianity to explore the field of cognitive science and apply its 
insights in their efforts to solve the puzzle of Christian origins.
Notes:
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1. Such dichotomy can be fond elsewhere in the cognitive research (e.g. Pinker 2005:9-10). The 
problem with such approaches is that (1) although scientific (or theological) concepts emerge in 
the work of generations of scholars, still individual minds can represent them; (2) even intuitive 
folk-concepts involve learning (e.g. Atran 2005:42-48); and (3) naïve and learned concepts are 
not discrete alternatives but graded qualities (as I am arguing here about music and religion).
2. This faculty is called ‘theory of mind’, ‘mind theory’, ‘mind reading’, ‘mentalising’ or ‘folk 
psychology’ (cf. Pinker 1998 [1997]: 329-33, 556-7; Leudar and Costall 2004)
3. In contemporary African oral traditions, the lists of ancestors serve to establish the ethos of the 
performer (Loubser 2003).
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